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Abstract
Coffee is an export-oriented commodity for producing countries, and it is actively traded at international commodity exchange
platforms viz., Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), New York and ICE, Europe. This study examines the interdependence of futures
and spot markets for coffee in the price discovery mechanism, particularly in the Indian context. The study has considered both
the International Coffee Organization (ICO) indicator prices and producers’ prices in India’s spot prices. The study confirms the
existence of a stable long-run relationship between ICE coffee futures and ICO spot prices, implying that both prices react to the
same set of market information. While there is an indication of equilibrium or long-run relationship between ICE Coffee futures
(New York) and Arabica producer prices (at farm gate level) in India, the same was not true for Robusta coffee. The absence of
co-integration between ICE futures prices (London) and Robusta producer prices in India suggested only a short-run relationship
between them. The findings of the study conclude with strong evidence that the farm gate prices in India have been caused by the
ICE futures markets, declining the contrary.
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1Low producers share in consumer rupee is mainly due to consolidation (Brand Market Power) of coffee industry on processing
(roasting) side and increased value addition in coffee importing countries (while a low level of value addition in producing
countries) resulted in increased profit share of downstream actors.
Introduction
Coffee is one of the most widely traded tropical
agricultural commodity in the world. It is primarily
an export-oriented commodity for many producing
countries. With over 80 per cent of coffee produced
being exported, it serves as a source of export
earnings for the producing nations while providing
a strong livelihood basis for about 25 million small
coffee farmers globally. Thus, it is the key
contributor to foreign exchange earnings for nearly
50 producing countries, most of them comprising
of developing economies of Central and South
America, Africa and Asia (Watson and Achinelli,
2008). Coffee is a major source of income for more
than 12 million farms globally, a quarter of which
are operated by women (ICO, 2019a and ICO,
2018b). Further, the various factors in the coffee
value chain, domestic and overseas, earn economic
benefits, be they agents, traders, hullers, curers,
roasters, retailers, exporters and importers and their
workforce, with an estimated 100 million families
depending on the coffee sector (ICO, 2019a).
With coffee production increasing by more than
65 per cent since the 1990s, the producing countries
earn around USD 20 billion in exports in a year.
The corresponding income of the coffee sector as a
whole is estimated to exceed USD 220 billion (ICO,
2019a). Thus it is evident that the value realization
for producing countries from the green coffee
exports (USD 20 billion) is less than 10 per cent of
the total income generated in the coffee retail market
(USD 220 billion)1. With its lengthy value chain,
the several actors and marketing functions such as
processing, value addition, storage, traceability etc.,
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escalate the marketing costs. In whatever case, the
producers’ share in consumer’s rupee is
considerably low.
Despite significant growth in the global coffee
sector, coffee bean prices evidenced a declining
trend since November 2016 (Fig. 1). The
International Coffee Organization (ICO) indicator
prices declined substantially (33%; a monthly
average decline of about 1%, over the past three
years) from 145.82 US cents/lb in November 2016
to 97.74 US cents/lb during September 2019. On
the contrary, the production costs are increasing due
to the increasing wage rate and input costs as
economies in the producing countries are growing.
Consequently, growers are succumbed to declining
income and posing a serious threat to the
sustainability of the coffee sector and the coffee
supply in the future.
The coffee prices are mainly determined by
market forces of demand and supply, particularly
production, consumption and stock movements.
Demand for coffee being inelastic, its consumption
shows little variations to changes in price, as it lacks
close substitutes (ICO, 2019a). While coffee
consumption is growing steadily at a healthy annual
rate of 2 per cent from 2015 to 2019 (ICO, 2019c),
there have been various issues affecting coffee
production worldwide on the supply-side. Climate
change is affecting coffee productivity and
eventually affecting its production in most growing
nations, including India. As a result, the global
coffee market is in persistent disequilibrium created
by cycles of imbalance in supply and demand.
At present, the coffee market is in
disequilibrium due to cumulative oversupply. The
ICO estimated global coffee production in 2018-19
at 168.87 million bags (60 kg each) which exceeded
global consumption (164.82 million bags) by 4.05
million bags, a second consecutive year of surplus.
The total cumulative surplus of 5.48 million bags
for the past two years is attributed to the prevailing
low coffee prices (ICO, 2019b).
Since coffee is an export-oriented commodity
for the producing countries, the domestic purchase
prices of coffee in the producing countries mainly
depend on the international price movements.
Coffee is actively traded at international commodity
exchange. There are two major international
commodity exchanges for coffee2, each of which
effectively acts as a basis to compare coffees of
Fig. 1. ICO Composite indicator prices US Cents Ib-1
2It is pertinent to note that in addition to ICE New York and Europe markets, there are a number of smaller coffee futures markets
across the world including Singapore (Singapore Commodity Exchange for Robusta coffee) and Brazil (Bolsa de Mercadorias &
Futuros for Arabica coffee).
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different origin and quality. Coffee ‘C’ contract
traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in
New York is the benchmark for Arabica coffee. The
Robusta futures contract traded on ICE Europe
serves as the standard for Robusta coffee. Here, we
restrict to considering these two futures markets for
coffee as these are, by far, the two largest (Scholer,
2004).
Futures markets play an important role in
transparent price discovery, dissemination and risk
transfer (Hall et al., 2006). Coffee is subject to
significant price volatility compared to other tropical
agricultural commodities like cocoa (Gilbert and
Morgan, 2010). These volatile and low coffee prices
have an adverse impact on the livelihood of 25
million small coffee growers across the world and
3.73 lakh smallholders in India. The global coffee
value chain and the market structure changed
dramatically after the deregulation, from monopoly
to liberalized markets. Since the liberalization of
coffee markets, farm gate prices in the producing
countries have been increased but have led to very
high volatility. Small coffee growers in developing
countries are more vulnerable to the upswings and
downswings that happen day to day on international
commodity exchange platforms. Consequently,
understanding the role of coffee futures markets in
determining spot or producers prices has been the
subject of significant academic attention (Kaminsky
and Kumar, 1990; Morgan et al., 1999; Mohan,
2007).
Against this backdrop, an attempt has been
made to understand the relationship between the
futures prices (a contractual agreement to purchase
the commodity at a future date) and spot prices
(current coffee price for immediate delivery) of both
Arabica and Robusta coffee.
Materials and methods
The methodology adopted uses statistical tests
to examine the extent of the relationship between
ICE coffee future prices and spot prices, both in the
long run and short run. The analysis was carried
out based on monthly observations of Arabica and
Robusta coffee prices from January 1990 to
September 2019. This period corresponds to the
free-market era, the post-regulated period under the
International Coffee Agreements from 1963 to 1989,
which were intended to manage global supply to
maintain price stability (ICO, 2014). Futures market
prices indicate a combined view of buyers and
sellers of their expected futures market conditions.
Similarly, the ICO produces a set of composite price
indices intended to form representative benchmarks
for the major types of green coffee (denoting spot
prices). Further, these data are often used by coffee
authorities to calculate payments to coffee growers
in producing countries and are often used as spot
prices (Fry et al., 2011), which indicate the current
condition of fundamental factors viz., actual demand
trend and supply shocks. The Spot price series used
in the analysis contains monthly observations of
ICO indicator prices of the four groups (Colombian
Milds, Other Milds, Brazilian naturals and
Robustas), and the futures prices comprise an
average of 2nd and 3rd positions3 of ICE, New York -
‘C’ Contract for Arabica coffee and ICE, Europe
for Robusta coffee traded in London.
In addition to the ICO indicator prices being
employed to represent the Spot market, the study
also used the monthly average farm gate prices in
India (sourced from ICO) to examine the
relationship between futures and spot prices.
Internationally, Indian Arabica coffees are grouped
under the ‘Other Milds’ group, and Robusta coffees
from all the producing countries are grouped as
‘Robustas’.  All the prices are given in US cents/lb.
The price series are tested for stationary using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and
Fuller, 1981), both with and without a trend. The
ADF test is used to test the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity against an alternative of stationarity of
the price data under consideration. The Breusch-
Godfrey statistic is used to select the optimum
number of lags to ensure the absence of serial
correlation in the ADF equation (Greene, 2000). In
practice, the following three different forms of ADF
3Since the coffee standard contracts are traded on exchanges, the delivery date (the final date by which the futures contract for a
commodity must be delivered) is chosen from the set of calendar months, called the trading position (For Arabica; March, May,
July, September, and December and for Robusta; January, March, May, July, September, November). The month closest to delivery
is called first position; the following is the second position and so forth (International Trade Centre, 2011).
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equations are required for estimation by the ordinary
least square method.
The maximum Eigen value test starts from the
null hypothesis of no co-integration equation and
tests against a different alternative. The rejecting of
the null hypothesis using the maximum Eigen value
is slightly different from the trace test. Though both
forms are based on the assumption of no co-
integration in their null hypothesis, rejecting the null
based on the maximum Eigen value implies that
there is just a single possible combination of the
non-stationary variables to yield in a stationary
process. The corresponding test statistic for the
maximum Eigen value is given below:Where, t is the time trend, k represents the
number of lags chosen in the model. The null
hypothesis of the existence of unit root is H0;β=0,
(Eq. 1) is a pure random walk, (Eq. 2) with an
intercept term αt and (Eq. 3) includes both a constant
and a linear time trend, δt. This methodology was
employed in the study by the International Coffee
Organization  (ICO, 2018a). In the present study,
equations 2 and 3 are used for testing the stationarity
of time series price data. In summary, if futures and
sport prices are found to be I (1), they can be tested
for co-integration.
The conformation that all price series are
stationary at I (1) allows proceeding for the co-
integration test. The ICE futures prices and spot
prices are tested for co-integration by employing
the Johansen test. The procedure introduced by
Johansen (1991), the null hypothesis of no co-
integration, will be tested against the alternative of
one co-integrating equation. Johansen co-integration
test uses the vector autoregressive (VAR) method,
in which all co-integrated series are assumed
endogenous. The Johansen tests are likelihood ratio
tests as it relies on maximum likelihood method,
there are two test statistics viz., 1) Trace test and 2)
Maximum Eigen value test. Under the Trace test,
the null hypothesis is based on the assumption of
no co-integration equation, which needs to be
rejected to establish co-integration between the time
series variables. The trace test statistic is given
below:




Δ yt = βtΥt-1 + Σ  γΔyi-1+εt...........................(Eq. 1)
Δ yt = αt+βtyt-1+ Σ  γiΔyt-i+εt........................(Eq. 2)







Here T is the sample size, and λ
i
^ is the ith
largest canonical correlation.
The trace test examines the null hypothesis of
‘r’ cointegrating vectors against the alternative
hypothesis of ‘n’ co-integrating vectors. On the other
hand, the maximum Eigen value test tests the null
hypothesis of ‘r’ co-integrating vectors against the
alternative hypothesis of ‘r +1’ co-integrating
vectors (Hjalmarsson and Österholm, 2007).
Having ensured the presence of a co-integration
relationship between the futures and spot prices, the
influence/direction of causation (spot to futures or
otherwise) in coffee price discovery is examined
using the Granger casualty test. In the case of two
time-series price variables, futures prices are said
to Granger-cause spot prices if spot prices can be
better predicted using the histories of both futures
prices and spot prices rather than using spot
prices alone.
After identifying the requisite properties of the
individual price series (lag length and unit root),
the presence of Granger causality between ICE
futures prices and spot prices is tested by estimating
the following unrestricted model:















..  ...(Eq. 6)
Where, Sct is the log of each ICO coffee price
indicator (c) at year t, D is the first difference of
variable, for example for coffee spot prices: D and
D. is the lagged ICE coffee futures prices (New York
and Europe) at time t, in its stationary form, m is
.................................(Eq. 5))1ln( ^ 1max   rTJ
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In the present study, two econometric
approaches were employed to study the causal
interaction between coffee futures and spot prices:
the Johansen co-integration test, to ascertain the
presence of long-run or equilibrium relationship,
and the Granger causality test to examine the short-
run dynamics.
Results and discussion
Stationary test for different price series - ADF
The estimated results of the ADF test are
presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 represents
results pertaining to equation 2 (with intercept but
no time trend).
The second column of the table represents the
ADF test results for individual price series under
study in level, while the third column shows the
results for the first difference of price series under
study. Both futures prices (ICE New York and ICE
Europe) and spot prices (Colombian milds, Other
milds, Brazilian naturals, Robustas and farm gate
price paid to growers in India) are non-stationary in
level but stationary after the first difference (Table 1).
Further, Table 2, representing the ADF test (equation
3) with constant and time trend, indicates that the
spot prices and futures prices are stationary at the
first-order difference. Although the ICE New York
futures market price is stationary in the level itself,
its first difference is considered to make the two
series (both futures and spot) have the same order
of integration.
The estimated results reveal that the ADF test
cannot reject a null hypothesis that the price series
............................(Eq. 7)
Table 1. ADF test results, including constant but no time trend (Estimates of equation-2)
Future/spot prices Test statistic P-value
Level First difference* Level First difference*
-2.98 -10.61 0.04 0.00
-2.43 -19.23 0.13 0.00
ICE New York future market prices -2.70 -15.78 0.07 0.00
Colombian milds group indicator prices -2.90 -10.35 0.05 0.00
Price paid to Arabica coffee growers in India -2.28 -13.44 0.18 0.00
ICE Europe future market prices -3.13 -9.75 0.03 0.00
Robustas -2.82 -9.93 0.06 0.00
Price paid to Robusta coffee growers in India -1.99 -17.20 0.29 0.00
*statistical significance at 5%
the optimal lag length. The residual sum of squares
is recoded (ESSu) after estimating the model, then
estimated with the following restricted model:
The residual sum of squares (ESSr) is recorded
after estimating the restricted model.
Granger causality test is performed by
calculating the F-statistic and comparing it to the
F-critical value at a 5 per cent level of significance.
The F statistic computed as follows:
where, m is the optimal lag length, n is the
number of observations ‘m’ and (n-1-m) is the
degrees of freedom.
The Granger causality test compares the
residual sum of squares of both unrestricted and
restricted econometric model. The null hypothesis
of no causality between futures and spot prices is
tested against the alternative hypothesis of its
existence. The null hypothesis can be rejected when
the estimated F statistic is greater than the F critical
value and  there is evidence of the existence of
causality between two price series. This
methodology was employed in the study “Futures
markets: the role of non-commercial traders” by the
International Coffee Organization (ICO, 2018C).
Babu and Muniyappa
61
are non-stationary at a significance level of 5 per
cent. However, in the first difference, both futures
and spot price series were found to be stationary
and, therefore, were integrated of order one, i.e. I (1).
Co-integration test
Johansen co-integration test is employed to test
the existence of the long-run relationship between
the futures and spot price series. Given that all the
price series viz., ICE New York and ICE Europe
futures prices and spot prices (represented by
indicator prices of Colombian Milds, Other Milds,
Brazilian naturals and Robustas and the farm gate
price paid to growers in India) in the study are
integrated of the same order I (1), the analysis
proceeded with Johansen co-integration test to
examine whether the two price series co-integrated.
Table 3 represents the co-integration test results
between ICE New York and Europe futures price
series and ICO indicator (spot) price series4. Table 4
indicates the co-integration test results between ICE
New York and Europe Futures prices and farm gate
prices in India. The number of equations in the
analysis depends on the number of price series used.
The maximum number of equations could be the
number of price series minus one. Since we have
only two price series, the maximum number of
equations we can have is only one. In all the cases
(futures and spot combinations), both Trace and
maximum Eigen value tests show the existence of
one co-integrating equation. Thus, as per both the
tests, the null hypothesis of no co-integration can
be rejected in all cases, at a five per cent significance
level (the p-value below 5% indicates this). The
estimated results of Johansen’s test indicate the
presence of one co-integrating equation, which
shows the existence of a stable long-run relationship
between the  ICE coffee futures and spot prices viz.,
Colombian Milds, Other Milds, Brazilian naturals
and Robustas. Thus they share a common stochastic
factor and react to the same set of information. This
means that any deviations from this long-run
relationship will be corrected. Statistically, the
existence of co-integration between two-time series
variables rules out non-causality between them. It
supports the assumption of a stable long-run or
equilibrium relationship between futures and spot
prices.
Nevertheless, in the case of the two ICE coffee
futures markets, the existence of co-integration is
observed at a 5 per cent level of significance as per
Trace statistic. Still, no co-integration has been
found as per the maximum Eigen value statistic.
Trace Statistic results of the existence of co-
integration between two coffee futures markets are
Table 2. ADF test results, including constant and trend (Estimates of equation-3)
Future/spot prices Test statistic P-value
Level First difference* Level First difference*
ICE New York future market prices -3.14 -10.60 0.10 0.00
Colombian milds group indicator prices -2.50 -19.21 0.33 0.00
Other milds group indicator prices -2.97 -15.76 0.14 0.00
Brazilian naturals group indicator prices -3.06 -10.34 0.12 0.00
Composite group indicator prices -2.86 -10.33 0.18 0.00
Price paid to Arabica coffee growers in India -2.80 -13.42 0.20 0.00
ICE Europe future market prices (Robustas) -3.21 -9.74 0.08 0.00
Robustas -2.92 -9.92 0.16 0.00
Price paid to Robusta coffee growers in India -2.37 -17.18 0.40 0.00
*statistical significance at 5%
4Since the terms spot/indicator prices and farm gate prices sound very similar, it is important to distinguish between them. The
Indicator prices, published on daily basis by International Coffee Organization, indicates the spot/cash prices quoted individually
for four main types of coffee (Colombian Milds, Other Milds, Brazilian naturals and Robustas) in respective markets, calculated
by computing a weighted average of coffee prices, after considering many factors such as ex-dock, prompt shipment prices etc.
On the other hand, farm gate prices represent the prices prevailed at farm gate in producing countries, in our study, it is Indian
farm gate coffee prices.
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in line with the earlier study conducted by Karbuz
and Jumah (1995). The study tested the presence of
co-integration between two coffee future markets
(ICE New York and ICE Europe) and also tested
the law of one price for coffee ICE futures markets
traded in New York and London. The authors found
the existence of co-integration between them and
interpreted it as indicative of a state of perfect
competition between the two coffee ICE futures
markets.
However, the hypothesis of the Law of one
price is rejected due to product differentiation
between the two major coffee types, Arabica (traded
in ICE New York futures market) and Robusta
(traded in ICE Europe futures market). Further,
based on the Trace and maximum Eigen value
statistics, the null hypothesis of the existence of no
co-integration relationship between ICE New York
futures prices and farm gate prices of Arabica coffee
in India can be rejected. However, the null
hypothesis of the existence of no co-integration
relationship between ICE Europe futures prices and
farm gate prices of Robusta coffee in India cannot
be rejected based on both Trace and maximum Eigen
value statistics (Table 4).
The study results are in line with the study
conducted by Rajaraman (1986), wherein the
efficiency of futures markets for coffee is analyzed
and concluded that the coffee futures market in New
York is efficient but rejects this hypothesis for the
London-based market (ICE Europe). The absence
of co-integration (in the case of Robustas) suggests
that there might be only a short-run relationship
between two-time series variables.
Co-integration between two-time series is not
just an indication of the presence of a long-run or
equilibrium relationship between the variables
caused by market forces. Still, there may exist a
causal relationship among them which is examined
using the Granger causality test.
Table 3. Co-integration test results of ICE futures prices and ICO indicator prices (spot prices)
Price series No. of Trace test Max eigen value
co-integration Test p-value Test p-value
equations  statistic  statistic
ICE New York future prices and Colombian milds 0 22.89 * 0.00 16.11 * 0.03
1 6.77 * 0.01 6.77 * 0.01
ICE New York future prices and other milds 0 21.85 * 0.00 15.39 * 0.03
1 6.46 * 0.01 6.46 * 0.01
ICE New York future prices and Brazilian naturals 0 20.92 * 0.01 14.46 * 0.05
1 6.45 * 0.01 6.45 * 0.01
ICE Europe future prices and Robustas 0 22.10 * 0.00 18.20 * 0.01
1 3.90 * 0.05 3.90 * 0.05
ICE New York future price and ICE Europe futures prices 0 15.84 * 0.04 9.01 0.28
1 6.83 * 0.01 6.83 * 0.01
*statistical significance at 5%
Table 4. Co-integration test results of ICE future prices and farm gate coffee prices in India
Price series No. of Trace test Max. eigen value
co-integration Test p-value Test p-value
equations statistic  statistic
ICE New York futures prices and Arabica 0 22.51 * 0.00 17.34 * 0.02
1 5.17 * 0.02 5.17 * 0.02
ICE Europe future prices and Robusta 0 13.45 0.10 10.23 0.20
1 3.21 0.07 3.21 0.07




If two-time series variables are co-integrated,
there may exist a Granger causality between them
(Miller, 1991; Miller and Russek, 1990). While the
co-integration analysis was necessitated by testing
the long-run relationship between the price series,
it does not indicate the direction of causation. The
question of whether spot prices cause futures prices
or futures prices cause spot prices are unanswered.
The Granger causality test between them would
indicate the price in one market, would commonly
be found to Granger cause the price in the other
market, and/or vice versa (Fackler and Goodwin,
2001).
Thus, the Granger causality test provides
additional evidence of whether and in which
direction price transmission occurs between two
markets (Paul and  Sinha, 2015). The earlier studies
(Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992; Figlewski, 1981;
Kocagil and Shachmurove, 1998; Kyriacou and
Sarno, 1999) related to the Granger causality test
between futures and spot market reported
bidirectional causality between futures and spot
markets. The present study examines whether a
similar relationship exists between coffee futures
and spot markets. The results of Granger causality
tests are extremely sensitive to the lag condition
(Thornton and Batten, 1984). It should be noted here
that the Granger causality results may vary for the
different number of lags (Paul and Sinha, 2015).
Too few lags indicate a biased test due to residual
auto-correlation, and too many lags allow for
potentially spurious rejections of the null hypothesis
(Lütkepohl, 2005). The optimum lag for the Granger
causality test is selected based on the lowest
information criteria. In the present study, it is found
that the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values
are minimum at lag two to four (for different spot
prices). Accordingly, a specific lag length of two to
four is used for testing the Granger causality.
In the case of Colombian milds and other milds,
there is causality in both directions (significant
p-value for both directions of causation). Thus, the
analysis indicates a strong interdependence between
coffee futures and spot prices (Colombian milds and
other milds).  In the case of Brazilian naturals, there
exists a unidirectional relationship of the spot prices
ganger causing futures prices, indicating local
producer prices in Brazil seem to incorporate new
market information faster than the New York futures
market (Table 5). Brazil is the largest coffee
producer globally; the influence of Brazilian spot
price on futures price is evident. The existence of
sufficiently liquid exchange5 and strong domestic
consumption in Brazil add to such prominent
causation (ICO, 2018a). Study results further
Table 5. Granger causality between coffee future prices and ICO indicator prices (spot prices)
Price series Null hypothesis F-statistic p-value
ICE New York Colombian Milds does not Granger cause ICE New York futures prices 5.26* 0.01
Futures prices and ICE New York Future Prices does not Granger cause Colombian milds 9.87* 0.00
Colombian Milds
ICE New York Other milds do not Granger cause ICE New York futures prices 4.09* 0.02
futures prices and ICE New York futures prices do not Granger cause other milds 3.94* 0.02
other milds
ICE New York Brazilian naturals do not Granger Cause ICE New York futures prices 3.24* 0.04
futures prices and
Brazilian naturals ICE New York futures prices do not Granger cause Brazilian naturals 1.12 0.33
ICE Europe Robustas does not Granger cause ICE Europe futures prices 2.06 0.09
futures prices ICE Europe futures prices do not Granger cause Robustas 3.42* 0.01
and Robustas
ICE New York ICE Europe does not Granger cause ICE New York 0.29 0.88
futures market and ICE New York futures  does not Granger cause ICE Europe futures 0.41 0.80
ICE Europe futures
market
*statistical significance at 5%
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revealed that the interdependence between the
coffee futures and spot market might not be
restricted to the unidirectional flow of information
from futures to spot market. It could be in the
opposite direction as well. The results of the study
also revealed that Brazil, with the giant share in
world coffee production, is the price maker in the
international market.
Further, there exists a unidirectional
relationship between ICE Europe and Robustas,
indicating that, Robusta spot market remains
influenced by ICE Europe coffee futures markets
to a greater extent. The study results are in
consonance with the study conducted by Fry et al.
(2011). Granger causality test between two ICE
coffee futures markets indicates a limited possibility
of running causality from one to another, as they
pertain to entirely different coffees (Arabicas and
Robustas).
Coming to the causality test (Table 6), the ICE
New York futures prices Granger cause farm gate
prices of Arabica coffee in India. Although the
Johansen test results rule out co-integration between
ICE Europe futures prices and farm prices of
Robusta coffee in India, there is a unidirectional
relationship of the ICE Europe futures prices Ganger
cause farm gate prices of Robusta coffee in India.
Therefore, there is feedback from ICE futures prices
to spot prices, leading to a price discovery
mechanism, providing a sound basis for coffee
production and marketing decisions of coffee
growers in India. Thus, the coffee ICE futures
markets play a dominant role in discovering farm
gate coffee prices in India. The study results are in
consonance with the study conducted by Fortenbery
and Zapata (2004), which indicated a close
relationship between ICE New York coffee futures
prices and cash export prices in Guatemala Honduras.
Contrary to Brazil, India, with a mere 3.5 per cent
share in world coffee production, does not
significantly influence international coffee prices.
Hence, we are basically ‘price takers’ rather than
‘price influencers’. Therefore, most of the times,
growers sold their coffee at a price that has nothing
to do with production costs. This indicates that
although the existing coffee futures market system
is well-intended for bringing efficiency in the global
coffee trade, it has failed to help the growers in the
high cost producing countries like India6. While
Indian coffee growers are already struggling with
the rising input costs and erratic weather patterns,
the current market pricing mechanism does not
compensate the production cost (especially in the
case of Arabica coffee) on the one hand and the
conservation efforts of shade coffee growers on the
other. Thus, there is a strong necessity for evolving
a more efficient market pricing system that links
Table 6. Granger causality between coffee futures prices and farm gate coffee prices in India
Price series Null hypothesis F-statistic p-value
ICE New York futures Farm gate prices of Arabica coffee in India does not Granger cause
prices and the price paid ICE New York futures prices 1.82 0.16
to coffee growers ICE New York futures prices do not Granger cause farm gate price of
(Arabica) in India. Arabica coffee in India 9.53* 0.00
ICE Europe Futures Prices Price Paid to Coffee Growers (Robusta) in India does not Granger cause
and farm gate prices of ICE Europe Futures Prices 0.79 0.54
Robusta coffee in India ICE Europe futures prices do not Granger cause price paid to coffee
growers (Robusta) in India 8.14* 0.00
*statistical significance at 5%
5Brazil’s functional Brasil Bolsa Balcão S.A., formerly BM&FBOVESPA futures  exchange is more liquid and deeper with higher
number of trades and turnover (Avdjiev et al, 2010; Kaltenbrunner, 2010 and  Fritz and Plates, 2014).
6Brazil and Vietnam are the low cost producing countries due to their high productivity which is attributed to adoption of intensive
production model with mechanization. While, other coffee producing countries like India are high cost producing countries due
to low productivity levels which is attributed to predominance of small holders, hilly terrain hindering mechanization, poor




coffee prices to production cost and independent of
outside forces.
Conclusion
The findings of the study proved that the
presence of co-integration between coffee futures
and spot prices, indicating that both the price series
share a common stochastic factor and react to the
same set of market information. Yet again, the
Brazilian spot coffee market to influence ICE future
prices, New York (while the contrary was not
holding good) reiterates the dominance of the giant
producer even in the international market platform.
Thus, Brazil’s coffee production and exports play
an important role in setting the benchmark for coffee
prices at the International level.  Further, the
econometric analysis of the role of the ICE coffee
futures market in the price discovery mechanism at
the farm gate level in India indicated that ICE New
York and Europe coffee futures market plays a
prominent role in the price discovery process for
Indian coffees. The study points out that though the
futures Market intends to develop an efficient
pricing mechanism since India is only a small
supplier to the International market, the costing of
producers does not have consideration in price
setting. In an economic context, though we say that
the prices are determined by market demand and
supply considerations since the emerging efficient
producers like Brazil and Vietnam grow coffee in
open conditions with intensive cultivation practices,
Indian growers stand at a losing end. This is because,
Indian coffee being shade-grown in ecologically
sensitive zones of Western Ghats (one of the
biodiversity hotspot in the World), has a lower yield.
Thus, a strong need for evolving an improved pricing
mechanism to consider Indian conservation efforts
to offer higher premium prices is essential. Such
efforts would help in promoting the conservation
efforts of small coffee growers of India.
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